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KSA 23.05.19After domestic extremists attempted several attacks against US bulk electric system (BES) components in 2022, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission warned of a likely escalation of attacks on BES in 2023 and directed the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to tighten rules for low-risk systems from vulnerabilities introduced either intentionally or by accident by authorized vendors in electrical component supply chains. NERC's new rules, announced in March 2023, extend many of the same cybersecurity requirements to low-risk system components it imposes on more critical systems.
In a broader effort to address virtual threats, the Biden administration released the U.S. National Cybersecurity Strategy, which articulates how the White House intends to address cybersecurity threats even as it embarks on the largest expansion of US infrastructure since establishing the interstate highway system.
This Guidehouse Insights study reviews recent regulatory efforts to address emerging cybersecurity threats and explores how microgrids should be configured to reduce their vulnerability to cybersecurity risks. It also looks at how they can be deployed as active cybersecurity solutions, countermeasures that can identify, isolate, and eliminate cybersecurity threats, mitigate damages, and help stakeholders meet new, more stringent cybersecurity regulations.
Spark
Context
Recommendations
Microgrids Can Be Cybersecurity Solutions
New Cybersecurity Standards Are Impacting Microgrid Software Vendors and OEMs
Europe Faces Additional Threats from State Actors
Distributed Energy Resources Integration Creates New Security Risks
FERC Order 2222 Could Increase Vulnerabilities from DER Aggregations
Poorly Deployed Microgrids Can Open Cybersecurity Attack Vectors
Communications Protocols Present the Greatest Vulnerability
Selecting a Protective Microgrid Communications Protocol
Perimeter Defenses Provide Insufficient Protection
Zero-Trust Architectures Treat Internal and External Users with Equal Suspicion
ZTAs Continuously Verify
ZTAs Minimize Impact
ZTAs Automate Context Collection and Response
Microgrids Can Be Integrated with ZTAs for Additional Cybersecurity
Critical Microgrid Configurations Provide Unique Cybersecurity Benefits
Networked Microgrid Communications Identify Attacks
Network Segmentation Isolates Threats
Microgrids Can Defend Against Cyberattacks
False Data Injection Attacks
Denial of Service Attacks
Smart Tracking Firewall
Signal Spoofing / Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
Ride-Through and Trip Threshold Manipulation
Microgrids Can Operate as Cybersecurity Countermeasures
Intrusion Detection
Automated Incident Response
Honey Pots
Utilities and Other Consumers Should Follow Best Cybersecurity Defense Practices
Employ a Zero-Trust Architecture
Deploy Multiple Threat Detection Strategies
Always Deploy IPv6 Networks Independently of, or Tunneled over, IPv4 Networks
Microgrid Vendors and OEMs Should Incorporate Cybersecurity at the Design Stage
U.S. Microgrid Software Developers and Manufacturers Should Avail Themselves of New DOE Cybersecurity R&D Programs and Funding
Clean Energy Cybersecurity Accelerator Program
Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response Grants
EaaS Microgrid Vendors Should Explore Cybersecurity Offerings